A framework for objective evaluation of privacy filters in video surveillance by Korshunov, Pavel et al.
Framework for Objective Evaluation of Privacy Filters
Pavel Korshunova, Andrea Melleb, Jean-Luc Dugelayb, and Touradj Ebrahimia
aMultimedia Signal Processing Group, EPFL, Switzerland;
bMultimedia Department, EURECOM, France;
ABSTRACT
Extensive adoption of video surveillance, affecting many aspects of our daily lives, alarms the public about
the increasing invasion into personal privacy. To address these concerns, many tools have been proposed for
protection of personal privacy in image and video. However, little is understood regarding the effectiveness of
such tools and especially their impact on the underlying surveillance tasks, leading to a tradeoff between the
preservation of privacy offered by these tools and the intelligibility of activities under video surveillance. In
this paper, we investigate this privacy-intelligibility tradeoff objectively by proposing an objective framework
for evaluation of privacy filters. We apply the proposed framework on a use case where privacy of people
is protected by obscuring faces, assuming an automated video surveillance system. We used several popular
privacy protection filters, such as blurring, pixelization, and masking and applied them with varying strengths to
people’s faces from different public datasets of video surveillance footage. Accuracy of face detection algorithm
was used as a measure of intelligibility (a face should be detected to perform a surveillance task), and accuracy
of face recognition algorithm as a measure of privacy (a specific person should not be identified). Under these
conditions, after application of an ideal privacy protection tool, an obfuscated face would be visible as a face but
would not be correctly identified by the recognition algorithm. The experiments demonstrate that, in general,
an increase in strength of privacy filters under consideration leads to an increase in privacy (i.e., reduction in
recognition accuracy) and to a decrease in intelligibility (i.e., reduction in detection accuracy). Masking also
shows to be the most favorable filter across all tested datasets.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The alarming rate at which video surveillance is being adopted has raised concerns among public and has
motivated development of privacy protection tools. Typical techniques used for obscuring personal information
in a video in order to preserve privacy include blurring and pixelization of sensitive regions or their masking.
More advanced privacy protection techniques have also been developed recently, such as scrambling,1 encryption
of faces in video,2 anonymization,3 geometrical warping,4 etc.
However, there is a noticeable lack of methods to assess the performance of privacy protection tools and their
impact on the surveillance task. While many evaluation protocols and tools (most notably those developed as
part of PETS∗ workshops and grand challenges) are available to test the robustness, accuracy, and efficiency of
video analytics for surveillance, little attention has been devoted to privacy aspects.
Previously, we proposed a subjective evaluation methodology to analyze the tradeoff between the preservation
of privacy offered by privacy protection filters and the intelligibility of activities under video surveillance.5 The
proposed methodology performed well in both laboratory6 and crowdsourcing environments.7 These subjective
evaluations demonstrated that the tradeoff between intelligibility and privacy can be quantified, and one can
find a suitable balance between the two for a given surveillance objective and visual privacy filter. Although,
subjective evaluation is undeniably the most accurate method of measuring subjective human perception (and
privacy is a subjective notion), such evaluations are time consuming and impractical. Therefore, the development
of objective metrics for measuring privacy and intelligibility is necessary for practical video surveillance systems.
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In this paper, we propose an objective framework for evaluation of visual privacy filters and for identifying
the privacy-intelligibility tradeoff. Typically, privacy filter is a specific type of visual distortion which aims
at obscuring personal visual details in video, leading to higher privacy protection, but retains their general
appearance, thus keeping the same level of intelligibility. Hence, an ideal privacy filter should hide all possible
personal details, resulting in the highest possible privacy protection, but keeps intact all visual information
necessary for the performance of a surveillance task. Therefore, for evaluation of a given privacy protection tool,
it would be intuitive to measure the amount of visual details as a metric of privacy and to measure an overall
general shape as a metric of intelligibility. The relative change in the metric values would then constitute the
privacy-intelligibility tradeoff.
To demonstrate this general framework, we consider the scenario where the face is a personal visual infor-
mation that needs to be protected. In such a scenario, we can use face recognition as a privacy metric, since
it requires fine details of faces to be visible to distinguish them from one another, and face detection as an
intelligibility metric, since it only aims at detecting a general appearance of a face. Hence, face detection should
continue to be possible after a privacy protection filter is applied, while facial personal features should be de-
stroyed. Therefore, for evaluation of a given privacy filter, one should check that a protected face is detectable
by a face detection algorithm but is not correctly identified by the recognition algorithm. Hence, the relative
accuracy of a face detection algorithm would reflect the intelligibility level of the assessed visual privacy filter,
while relative accuracy of recognition algorithm would reflect its level of privacy. By relative accuracy we under-
stand the change in accuracy compared to the original undistorted image (e.g., if original face was detected by
face detection and after privacy filter is applied, it is still detected, then the accuracy is 100%). As a practical
application of this scenario, we can assume an automated people counting surveillance system (in airports or
public transport), in which video face detection algorithm would be used for people counting and then served as
a possible input to a tracking algorithm. Since facial recognition is not part of such systems, to protect privacy
of people boarding a bus or walking in airports, faces should be obscured with privacy filters.
Using the above scenario, we evaluate three commonly used privacy protection filters: blurring, pixelization,
and masking. We apply these filters with different degrees of strength. For blurring, different degrees of strength
are achieved by varying the size of a Gaussian filter, for pixelization, by varying the size of a block, and for
masking – the level of opacity. We use widely popular OpenCV implementation of Viola-Jones face detection
algorithm8 as an intelligibility metric. Since there exists several state-of-art face recognition algorithms, we
consider three of them as candidates to be a privacy metric: based on Principal Component Analysis (PCA),9
based on Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA),10 and based on local features (LBP).11 Their implementations
are also available in OpenCV library. Since face detection and recognition algorithms are especially sensitive to
sizes of face visual regions and environmental conditions,12 we used three different publicly available datasets:
SCFace surveillance dataset,13 ChokePoint surveillance dataset,14 and FERET dataset15 for evaluation of face
recognition algorithms.
For each evaluated privacy protection filter, the relative changes in detection and recognition accuracies
constitute the privacy-intelligibility tradeoff. The filter can be considered to have a good tradeoff property if it
does not change the intelligibility (accuracy of face detection is the same as for the original undistorted image)
but it increases privacy to maximum (accuracy of face recognition decreases to zero).
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
The objective evaluation of several primitive privacy filters was first performed by Newton et al.,16 where the
authors demonstrated that such filters cannot adequately protect from the successful face recognition, because
recognition algorithms are robust. The robustness of face recognition and detection algorithms to primitive
distortions is also reported in Ref. 12. In the work by Dufaux et al.,17 a framework is defined to evaluate the
performance of face recognition algorithms applied to images altered by various obfuscation methods, based
on the Face Identification Evaluation System (FIES). Experiments using the FERET database showed the
ineffectiveness of na¨ıve face obfuscation techniques such as pixelization and blurring. The authors argue that
more sophisticated scrambling techniques are more effective in foiling face recognition.
Since privacy is a subjective notion, Korshunov et al.6 argued that the evaluation should be done subjectively.
Therefore, the authors define a subjective methodology for evaluation of privacy protection tools and propose a
subjective evaluation protocol, focusing on two important aspects: (i) how much of the privacy is protected by
such a tool and (ii) how much it impacts the efficiency of the underlying surveillance task (intelligibility). The
pixelization filter shows the best performance in terms of balancing between privacy protection and allowing suf-
ficient intelligibility. Masking filter, instead, demonstrates the highest privacy protection with low incorrectness
and high uncertainty, which can be suitable for the higher security surveillance applications.
For the crowdsourcing based evaluation,7 an online application VideoRate has been built which uses Facebook
ID for login and a more reliable user authentication. Compared to laboratory based evaluations, this approach
provides some flexibility to users, as one could stop participation in the experiments at any time, as well as
better simulates the real-time scenario, since the users evaluate videos in different lighting conditions and using
monitors with different resolutions and color settings. The call to participate was disseminated in the subjective
test using the VideoRate application via such social networks as Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn, as well as
various research mailing lists. With an estimated outreach to more than 1500, some 120 among them used the
application and submitted subjective scores. These subjective results were then compared with the results from
a similar evaluation conducted by a conventional approach in a designated research test laboratory at EPFL. The
results demonstrate a high correlation with only minor differences favoring the crowdsourcing method, which
means that it can be considered as a reliable and effective approach for subjective evaluation of visual privacy
filters.
Our proposed objective evaluation framework extends the ideas of earlier works16,17 into a privacy-intelligibility
tradeoff, demonstrated via subjective experiments by Korshunov et al.6,7 Hence, our framework, by considering
both privacy an intelligibility components and using objective metrics to measure them, provides an effective
practical tool for evaluation of privacy filters in video surveillance systems that heavily rely on video analysis
algorithms.
There are also a few system extensions that incorporate privacy protection into the existing surveillance
frameworks and systems.
The security of the privacy information in surveillance system is addressed in Ref. 18 by removing privacy-
sensitive information from the video sequence. A perceptually-based compressed-domain watermarking technique
is then used to securely embed this data in the video stream. Similarly, a secure reversible data hiding technique
is introduced in Ref. 19 for privacy data embedding. Some privacy data management is also proposed to allow
individual users to control access to their private data.
The authors of Ref. 20 focus on the problem of secure streaming of different surveillance video to different
client devices with different display sizes. The authors propose a secure device registration inside the surveillance
system to protect the private information of different users of the system. The system is domain-based, where
different devices of the same user can freely share data among themselves, with one device selected as a domain
controller that manages all other devices and stores the global relevant information. The system assumes a
dedicated surveillance system manager that manages video streaming rules for different devices and provides
them with a web interface. A dedicated licensing server is also proposed to manage users of the system and
their usage rights. This kind of solution is not really a privacy respecting surveillance system, since it does not
take into account the privacy of the surveyed persons at all, but it shows that secure management of the video
surveillance streams, devices, and their users is a very important aspect in video surveillance.
Policy framework specifying whether a person should be shown in a surveillance video is proposed in Ref. 21.
A set of control policies is developed using XML specification that describes who should be shown and who are
not in the surveillance footage depending on the validity of their RFID tags in the surveillance area.
A camera, called MPEG-7 camera for its processing capabilities and support of MPEG-7 standard, is proposed
in Ref. 22 that offers privacy protection. Its privacy protection is based on an object-oriented representation of
the scene. The system re-renders a modified video based on the end-user access control authorizations. During
re-rendering, areas of the image are blanked out or replaced by computer graphics. The relevant information in
the scene is therefore preserved, but privacy-sensitive details are not transmitted.
Based on similar ideas as above, the system introduced in Ref. 23 relies on computer vision to analyze the
video content and to automatically extract its components. Different users can selectively get access to these
components, depending on their access-control rights. More specifically, the system renders a different version
of the video where privacy-sensitive objects have been hidden. This is achieved while information required to
fulfill the surveillance task is preserved. The paper also describes a PrivacyCam, after the same idea as MPEG-
7 camera, with built-in privacy protection tools, which directly outputs video streams with privacy-sensitive
information removed.
The authors of Ref. 24 propose a real-time policy-based framework for privacy protection in video surveillance.
The authors consider granular privacy filters with their hierarchical composition, as well as the set of verifiable
policies using a standardized privacy specification language. The framework includes distributed live video
database (LVDBMS) that can be used to search live video streams and perform actions of interests on them
via its own query language. An administrator can associate privacy filters, defined using privacy specification
language (PSL), with camera, query, user group, or view. When there is a combination of privacy filters for
a given object, the filter with the highest priority (causing the most corruption to the video) is applied. For
evaluation of the proposed framework, the authors adopted both their own recordings of university campus and
road traffic scenarios and videos taken from the CAVIAR database. The authors evaluated the effectiveness of
their framework in terms of managing different queries with different privacy filters (only blurring and masking
filters were considered).
The focus of the above frameworks is on developing a smart and flexible system of policies and user control
mechanisms that would allow manageable access to privacy sensitive regions of surveillance video. Our framework
significantly differ from such policy-based frameworks since we provide the means to evaluate and to choose an
appropriate privacy protection tool suitable for a given surveillance system. After such privacy protection tools
are deployed in the surveillance system, policy-based frameworks can follow to help managing user access.
3. EVALUATION FRAMEWORK
In this section, we discuss the objective evaluation framework for privacy protection filters, which is based on
measurement and assessment of the privacy-intelligibility tradeoff. Typically, a privacy filter is a specific type of
visual distortion with the aim to obscure personal details in video (leading to higher privacy protection) while
retaining the general appearance of a person (keeping the same level of intelligibility). Hence, an ideal privacy
filter would hide all possible personal details, resulting in the highest possible privacy protection, but it would
keep intact all visual information necessary for the performance of a surveillance task. Therefore, to evaluate
privacy protection tools, we propose to measure the amount of visual details as a metric of privacy and to measure
an overall general shape, pattern, or behavior as metrics of intelligibility. Changes in these measurements would
then constitute the privacy-intelligibility tradeoff.
To demonstrate this general framework, we assume the face to be a personal visual information that should
be protected. Since we focus on objective evaluation, a possible application scenario where such evaluation would
be useful is an automated surveillance system that mostly relies on video analysis algorithms. An example of
such system could be an automatic people counting system on public transport. In such systems, all analysis
and scene understanding operations, such as face recognition or face detection, will be performed by a software
system in an automatic fashion, without the intervention of a human operator. Faces naturally carry significant
privacy sensitive information, since they allow associating images of subjects with their identity. At the same
time, faces carry intelligibility information as well: being able to detect faces in a scene is often the first step
towards higher-level intelligibility tasks, such as detecting whether a subject is wearing a mask, sunglasses or
other elements which could potentially signal a safety threat.
To protect the privacy of faces, a number of filters are commonly used both in video surveillance, broadcasting
and printed media applications. Most of such filters belong to the category of na¨ıve filters, i.e., basic image
processing techniques exploited to corrupt the original image from the human visual quality point of view. Little
work has been done so far to prove whether such filters are also able to protect privacy when automatic algorithms
are applied instead.
We selected three common privacy protection filters: blurring with a Gaussian kernel, pixelization by aver-
aging the privacy sensitive ROI in blocks of dimension b, and masking with a black rectangle. For each filter, we
can vary its strength, to obtain different levels of image data corruption: the blur filter can be tuned by varying
the size of the kernel. For pixelization, we can choose the size of the averaging block, obtaining an effect which is
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Figure 1: Sample images with privacy protection filters applied. (a)(f)(k) originals. (b)(c)(d)(e) blur at 5, 11, 17
and 23 kernel size respectively. (g)(h)(i)(j) pixelization with 4, 10, 16 and 22 averaging block size respectively.
(l)(m)(n)(o) masking with 0.1, 0.4, 0.7 and 1.0 opacity respectively.
equivalent to downsampling the image at different resolutions. Masking is typically applied by just replacing the
privacy sensitive ROI with a black rectangle, but we can assume that changing the opacity of the black rectangle
leads to different levels of privacy protection. Figure 1 shows a number of examples of the selected privacy filters
applied to the same subject image with different degrees of strength.
In recent years, there has been a growing research trend proposing new privacy protection filters, specifically
in the context of face identity protection, but most methods focus on issues such as reversibility, encryption,
or application to particular video compression standards. As a result, the visual quality of such advanced
filters does not differ significantly from the na¨ıve ones. Moreover, such advanced filters are currently not being
used in video surveillance systems, which are still in their infancy when comes to privacy protection and, at
the moment, mostly focus on implementation of privacy protection policies and user management rather than
privacy protection filters.
In the context of the described scenario, we propose face detection as a measure of intelligibility, and the
failure of automatic face recognition as a measure of privacy protection. More precisely, we adopt the percentage
of true positives achieved by the face detection algorithm, since we apply filters only inside face regions, and
therefore we are not interested in the behavior of the algorithm elsewhere (i.e., false positives). Similarly, for face
recognition we adopt rank 1 of the Cumulative Matching Characteristic (CMS), which represents the probability
of a subject being recognized among the list of all subjects in the training gallery. As a reminder, we recall that
in this work we are not evaluating the performance of a specific detection or recognition algorithm, but we are
rather interested in the relative variations of such performance between original and privacy protected images.
As face detection we adopt Viola-Jones object detection framework, described in Ref. 8, while for recognition
we test on three state-of-art algorithms, two of them based on global descriptors: Principal Component Analysis
(PCA)9 and Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA),10 and one based on local features (LBP).11 The similarity
measure adopted for PCA and LDA is based on Cosine Distance, while for LBP the histograms are compared
with the Chi Square test. All these algorithms are provided as open source implementations in the computer
vision library OpenCV.
3.1 Experimental procedure
Since we consider a fully automated system, it is correct to assume that the privacy filter is also applied by
an automatic procedure. If face detection on the original image fails, then no privacy filter is applied for this
particular image, which will considerably influence the final recognition scores at a later stage. Based on this
consideration, we first apply face detection to the original image, and then, conditionally, proceed with applying
filters and running face recognition on faces detected with face detection. First, we apply all selected privacy
filters with different degrees of strength. Then, the detection on protected image and recognition on an original
and protected image are performed, and results are recorded.
3.2 Datasets
Resolution (pixels) Pixels Per Face Image Format
FERET 256 × 384 50 tif (uncompressed)
SCFace - Far 75× 100 8 jpeg (compressed)
SCFace - Mid 108 × 144 18 jpeg (compressed)
SCFace - Close 168 × 224 27 jpeg (compressed)
ChokePoint 800 × 600 50 (best) - 20 (worst) jpeg (compressed)
Table 1: Image quality data for each dataset used in the experiments. Pixels per face refers to the distance
between eyes in pixels.
To make our evaluations practical, it is important to evaluate the selected privacy protection filters under
different environmental conditions and on surveillance video with different resolutions and various face sizes.
Therefore, we used three different publicaly available video surveillance datasets: SCFace dataset,13 ChokePoint
surveillance dataset,14 and FERET dataset.15
Each dataset provides images which are heterogeneous in terms of resolution and quality. Table 1 briefly
summarizes the image quality characteristics of each dataset and partitions used, in terms of provided image
resolution and average pixels per face (ppf) measure, which is taken as the number of pixels between eyes.
Resolution alone is not sufficient to describe image quality for face recognition, since subjects are acquired at
different unknown distances from the camera in each dataset or partition.
The Facial Recognition Technology (FERET) dataset15 consists of a corpus of 14′051 gray scale images
of persons with clearly visible faces and different facial expressions, under various environmental conditions,
including illumination, orientation, appearance and age variations. As recommended by the authors of FERET
dataset, we selected the frontal faces subset A as the training gallery for face recognition, and the frontal
faces subset B as a probe for all evaluation tests. For recognition purposes, the original set of 1′196 subjects
was reduced to a randomly selected gallery of 100 subjects. While face detection is applied on the original
non-cropped images, which include part of the background and body information as well, face recognition is
performed after aligning and cropping the face images according to ground truth for eye position.
The Surveillance Cameras Face (SCface)13 database is a set of static images of human faces. Images were
recorded in uncontrolled indoor environment using five video surveillance cameras of various qualities. Database
contains 4′160 static images of 130 subjects. Each face in the dataset is acquired with three different distances,
far, mid and close, which results in faces to vary in sizes greatly, thus, simulating a typical surveillance scenario
when a person is moving towards or away from the camera at different distances. We conducted our experiments
separately for each of the three subsets corresponding to these three different distances: far, mid, and close.
ChokePoint14 is a dataset designed for experiments in person identification and verification under real-world
surveillance conditions. An array of three cameras placed above several portals capture subjects walking through.
Faces in such sets will have variations in terms of illumination conditions, pose, sharpness, as well as misalignment
due to automatic face localization and detection. The dataset consists of 64′204 labeled face images, essentially
video frames, of 25 subjects.
4. EVALUATION RESULTS
Figure 2 demonstrates detection (graphs in the left column) and recognition (graphs in the right column) results
for blurring, pixelization, and masking filters for FERET dataset. For recognition graphs, the results from the
three different recognition algorithms are shown in the same plot together. For every graph in the figure, vertical
axis corresponds to the accuracy of detection or recognition respectively, and horizontal axis corresponds to the
different degrees of strength for a privacy filter. For the reference, accuracy for the original unprotected images
is indicated by a horizontal straight dashed line.
The top two graphs (Figures 2a and 2b) illustrate the detection and recognition results for the blurring
privacy filter with a kernel varying from 0 to a maximum of 23. From Figure 2a it can be noted that blurring
filter has little effect on the detection accuracy, even when extreme kernel sizes are used. Therefore, this type of
filter offers an intelligibility level comparable to the original image. On the other hand, recognition accuracy (see
Figure 2b) is significantly decreased by the blurring filter. Especially, the accuracy of local features-based LBP
algorithm dramatically drops from 0.9 to 0.35 even for a kernel size of 5. Global features-based face recognition
methods, such as PCA and LDA, are slightly more robust to blurring, showing steady decrease from kernel sizes
larger than 6. Figure 2b also shows a slight increase in accuracy for small blurring kernel, such as 3 or 5. This
phenomenon is probably due to the fact that a small amount of blurring can effectively be regarded as denoising,
which often has a positive effect on face recognition.
In evaluation of pixelization filter (Figures 2c and 2d), the size of pixelization blocks varies from 0 to a
maximum of 22 pixels. We can observe that pixelization has little effect on face detection (the same as for
blurring), with only extreme sizes of the pixelization blocks (larger than 16 pixels) degrading the accuracy
significantly. For recognition (see Figure 2d), the trend is similar to blurring, but the decrease in accuracy
is more rapid and, unlike blurring, with no gain in performance for small block sizes. This sudden drop in
performance is even more evident for the LBP-based face recognition algorithm, since its accuracy becomes
almost 0 for pixelization filter’s block sizes larger than 4.
While pixelization and blurring show similar results, masking is different as it is evident from Figures 2e
and 2f. Various opacity levels do not affect the detection at all except for the extreme value of 1.0, when
a black box covers the whole face. Such results can be expected from the Viola-Jones object detector, since
it relies on features computed as the differences between neighboring pixels. Adding or subtracting the same
amount to the gray level of all pixels will not affect much the values such features. Naturally, when we replace
the privacy sensitive image ROI with a black rectangle, the detection drops immediately to 0. This result
proves that full masking, a widely used filter in video surveillance application, is incapable of preserving any
intelligibility information. Recognition accuracy (see Figure 2f) for the masked images show a slower decreasing
trend compared to blurring and pixelization. We have to apply masking with a minimum of 0.5 opacity to see
some significant loss in recognition performance. Again, adding a small constant value to each pixel gray level
results in a non significant alteration of the source data.
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Figure 2: Detection and recognition results for varying filter strengths applied to FERET dataset. (a) and (b)
correspond to blur filter, (c) and (d) to pixelization filter, and (e) and (f) to masking filter.
For the other two datasets, the results show similar trends as for FERET dataset, hence, we omitted such
graphs to save space. Instead, we present the detection and recognition results as relative changes in detection
and recognition accuracies in Figures 3, 4 and 5 for FERET, SCFace, and ChokePoint datasets respectively,
which more clearly demonstrate privacy-intelligibility tradeoff. Intelligibility loss and privacy gain for each type
of privacy filter in these figures is computed as following,
IntelligibilityLoss = Do −Dp (1)
PrivacyGain = (1−Ro) − (1 −Rp) (2)
where D indicates the detection accuracy, R the recognition accuracy, o indicates a result obtained on original
unprotected images and p a result obtained on privacy protected images. We recall that privacy is inversely
proportional to the recognition rate. As a reference, in the figures, the original detection accuracy (for unpro-
tected images) is shown in parenthesis next to the intelligibility loss, and the original recognition accuracy (for
unprotected images) is shown next to each privacy gain.
(a) blur (b) pixelization (c) mask
Figure 3: Intelligibility loss and privacy gains for FERET dataset. Values in parenthesis refer to original absolute
detection accuracy for intelligibility loss and to original absolute recognition accuracies for privacy gains.
5. DISCUSSION
From privacy-intelligibility tradeoff results for FERET dataset in Figure 3, it is also evident that blurring and
pixelization show similar behavior, letting us increase the level of privacy protection by making the filter stronger,
while still keeping a very high intelligibility performance. In case of pixelization, for example, up to an 80% gain
in privacy protection on LBP based recognition system and around 60% on PCA/LDA systems can be obtained,
by only sacrificing about 10% of intelligibility. A pixelization block size equal to 20 can be used in practice.
Pixelization appears to be slightly better than blurring at preserving privacy, but at the cost of affecting more
the intelligibility for larger filter sizes.
The results in Figure 3c demonstrate that masking is effective only if applied with high but still partial opacity.
When opacity is less than 0.5, it has little effect on recognition accuracy, leading to low privacy protection. When
applied with full opacity, both recognition and detection fall to zero, offering a perfect privacy protection, but
no intelligibility information whatsoever. However, if 0.9 level of opacity is chosen, detection accuracy remains
as high as for smaller opacity level, while the drop in recognition accuracy is almost as significant as for full
opacity. That means applying masking filter with opacity 0.9 leads to both high privacy protection and high
intelligibility. This result suggests that partial opacity masking is the best filter to protect privacy in automatic
video surveillance systems, which contradicts previous findings from subjective evaluations6 and confirms the
observation that computer vision is different from human vision.12
Privacy-intelligibility tradeoff for SCFace dataset is presented in Figure 4 for different acquisition distances
separately. This dataset is characterized by a very low resolution of the input images (see Table 1) and acquisition
distances, which also reduce face sizes even further. For these reasons, Figure 4 shows extremely low recognition
accuracy even for original images. It can imply that in a video surveillance system with video of such low
resolutions, privacy is already protected, at least when no other advanced technology such as image super
resolution and multi-frame integration has been implemented. This observation is confirmed by the results,
since applying privacy filters does not lead to any gain in privacy on such low baseline. However, the detection
and, therefore, intelligibility performance depends on the distance for SCFace dataset. For example, for the
farthest camera, blurring with a small kernel of size 5 or pixelating with a block size of 2 already causes a 20%
loss in intelligibility (see Figures 4a and 4b). Masking offers better intelligibility performance on far distances
(see Figure 4c), allowing us to add up to 0.5 opacity without losing no more than 0.2 in the intelligibility.
Performance on intelligibility progressively improves, as expected, when the distance between the faces and the
camera is reduced. For example, we can blur with size of a kernel up to 7 on mid distances (see Figure 4d)
and 11 on close distances (see Figure 4g), with a decrease no lower than 10% intelligibility. A general trend we
observe, independently from the distance, is that pixelization causes the fastest drop in intelligibility, followed
by blur and by masking, which offer a much smoother decrease.
The results for ChokePoint dataset in Figure 5 show similar trends as for FERET and SCFace datasets with
results lying somewhere in between for those two datasets.
(a) blur - far distance (b) pixelization - far distance (c) mask - far distance
(d) blur - mid distance (e) pixelization - mid distance (f) mask - mid distance
(g) blur - close distance (h) pixelization - close distance (i) mask - close distance
Figure 4: Intelligibility loss and privacy gains for SCFace dataset. Values in parenthesis refer to original absolute
detection accuracy for intelligibility loss and to original absolute recognition accuracies for privacy gains.
By analyzing the performance of each face recognition algorithm (see Figures 3, 4 and 5), we can observe
that LBP is more sensitive to filtering than recognition methods based on global features (PCA and LDA). This
result can be explained by the fact that Local Binary Pattern relies on local contrast measure when computing
its features, which are strongly affected by pixelization and blurring filtering, since these filters can be considered
as local-based distortions. Since, local feature based methods for face recognition are becoming increasingly
popular in practice, due to their robustness to occlusion and variation in pose and illumination, then, a higher
level of privacy protection can be obtained even when using a weaker privacy protection filter.
From Figures 3, 4 and 5, we can also note that performance of both recognition and detection algorithms are
significantly affected by the original resolution of images (tested datasets have very different original resolutions,
see Table 1), or from another perspective, by the distance between the subjects and the camera (see results in
Figure 4 corresponding to different distances of SCFace dataset). Therefore, original video resolution should be
taken into account when designing privacy protection filters for a practical video surveillance system.
(a) blur (b) pixelization (c) mask
Figure 5: Intelligibility loss and privacy gains for ChokePoint dataset. Values in parenthesis refer to original
absolute detection accuracy for intelligibility loss and to original absolute recognition accuracies for privacy gains.
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have proposed an objective framework for evaluation of privacy protection filters by assessing
the privacy-intelligibility tradeoff. We demonstrated the practical application of this framework using examples
of face privacy protection that can be applicable in people counting automatic video surveillance systems. We
compared three typical privacy protection filters blurring, pixelization, and masking by varying their degrees of
strength. By using face detection as a metric for intelligibility and face recognition as a metric for privacy, we
investigated on different datasets the privacy-intelligibility tradeoff. The results showed that resolution of the
original face (alternatively, distance of a person from the camera) significantly affects the absolute accuracies of
detection and recognition, however, the corresponding relative values show consistent trend. These evaluations
suggest that masking filter with opacity 0.9 leads to the highest intelligibility (i.e., high detection accuracy) and
the highest privacy protection (i.e., low recognition accuracy). This result contradicts previous findings from
subjective evaluations, confirming an a priori observation that human perception differs from machine perception
in video analytics.
The considered simplest filters: blurring, pixelization, and masking, though popular, do not satisfy require-
ments of desirable privacy filters in current surveillance systems. Therefore, as future work, the evaluations
should also include more advanced privacy protection filters, such as scrambling or encryption based filters. Ob-
jective privacy evaluation framework should also be demonstrated in other surveillance scenarios such as object
tracking or event detection.
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